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A robust housing market buoyed the U.S. economy during the
2001 recession and fueled growth once recovery began. The record-setting
building of single-family homes created construction jobs and spurred
demand for building materials, appliances and home furnishings. Business
was brisk for mortgage lenders and real estate brokers alike. 
Perhaps even more significant, rapidly rising housing prices had
allowed consumers to tap into their mounting home equity, providing them
the financial wherewithal for a buying spree. By mid-2004, however, home
prices had risen to the point where many analysts worried that markets
were overheated, making homes less affordable, particularly for first-time
buyers already facing the drag of rising energy prices.
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Today, signs of a housing market
slowdown are unmistakable. New and
existing home sales have been declin-
ing since mid-2005, although they re-
main high by historical standards
(Chart 1A). Building activity has be-
gun to cool a bit, while single-family
housing permits have fallen 34 per-
cent from their peak, settling back to
pre-2002 levels (Chart 1B). The build-
ing permits data suggest further de-
clines in single-family construction are
likely, given the usual six to eight
months it takes to complete a home.
Housing prices are rising more
slowly—perhaps even beginning to
decline outright. In the second quarter,
the Office of Federal Housing Enter-
prise Oversight’s measure of home
price appreciation registered its big-
gest year-over-year slowdown since
recordkeeping began in 1975. Even
so, home-price gains remain solidly
positive at 10.1 percent by this meas-
ure, which partly controls for changes
in home quality by tracking only
prices from repeat sales (Chart 1C). 
More recent data, however, sug-
gest further deceleration in prices.
Median existing home prices dipped
1.2 percent in the third quarter from
year-earlier levels—the first year-over-
year decline since 1993 and the largest
drop since the series began in 1969
(see Chart 1C). The decline contrasts
with the 14.7 percent increase posted
a year earlier. New-home price-appre-
ciation rates have also turned down,
posting a year-over-year decline of 2.4
percent in the third quarter, the largest
drop since the early 1990s.
For the U.S. economy, slower
building activity and softer prices raise
the specter of reversing—at least in
part—the gains in housing starts posted
between 2001 and 2005. A retrenchment
in housing demand could affect growth
directly by depressing construction and
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U.S. Home Sales Slow from High Levels
Thousands of units
NOTE: Data are seasonally adjusted, annualized rates.

























Falling Permits Point to Slowing Home Construction
Thousands of permits
NOTES: Data are seasonally adjusted, annualized rates; contract values are chained, 2000. Shaded areas denote recessions.

















Home-Price Appreciation Slowing Sharply
Percent (year-over-year)
NOTE: Shaded areas denote recessions.
SOURCES: Freddie Mac; National Association of Realtors.3
ing multifamily units, accounts for just
6 percent of GDP. Even so, home-
building can significantly affect eco-
nomic growth. Residential construction
added about 0.5 percentage point to
GDP growth in 2004 and 2005 but sub-
tracted 1.1 percentage points in third
quarter 2006. Many forecasters project
further, but smaller, negative impacts
on GDP growth through most of 2007.
The indirect effects of a housing
slowdown could be larger than the
direct effects if the deceleration in
home prices leads to slower growth in
consumption, the largest component
of GDP. The risk of a consumption
slowdown is one reason policymakers
are monitoring housing prices and
home-equity withdrawals. 
The Consumption Connection
Housing’s link to consumption
occurs largely through changes in
wealth driven by home prices. In gen-
eral, higher asset prices encourage
spending by increasing the lifetime re-
sources of income and wealth house-
holds can consume. Of the types of
household wealth subject to large
price movements, the most important
are stock investments and housing. 
The Federal Reserve’s flow of
funds data provide a useful prism
through which to view recent years’
trends in wealth. At the turn of this
century, the value of stocks eclipsed
housing. From 2000 to 2005, U.S.
households’ real estate assets grew by
$9.1 trillion, while a decline in equity
prices reduced their stock wealth by
$2.5 trillion. Today the two categories
make up roughly the same percentage
of households’ net wealth (Chart 2).
Studies show that historically a $100
rise in housing wealth leads to about
a $6 rise in long-run consumption,
one and one-half times the $4 gain
that would result from the same
increase in stock wealth.
2
Why is housing’s wealth effect
stronger than the stock market’s? The
answer depends on how long-lasting
asset-price changes are viewed, the
distribution of particular forms of
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS EconomicLetter
wealth and the liquidity of an asset—
the ease and cost at which households
can sell or borrow against its value. 
First, home prices are less volatile
than stock values, so consumers are
more likely to consider gains in hous-
ing wealth as more permanent. 
Second, there are large differences
in the distribution of these asset hold-
ings. Stock ownership is very concen-
trated among high-income households,
whose consumption is less sensitive
than moderate-income families’ to
changes in wealth.
3 Homeownership,
meanwhile, is spread more evenly. Al-
though stock ownership has doubled
since the early 1970s to roughly 50 per-
cent of households today, homeowner-
ship rates are still higher, at 68 percent.
While many households own stock,
the amounts are small relative to
housing wealth for most homeowners.
Even before the collapse of technolo-
gy stocks in 2000 and the recent run-
up of housing prices, only 5 percent
of households had a higher share of
net wealth in stocks than in housing.
4
Third, whereas the volatility and
distributional differences between stock
and housing wealth imply a larger
effect of housing wealth on consump-
tion, the differences in liquidity enhance
the relative effect of stock wealth. Fore-
most is the smaller transaction cost of
selling stocks compared with selling a
home. This helps account for the near-
ly 100 percent turnover of New York
Stock Exchange listings in a typical year,
while the annual turnover of homes in
stable neighborhoods is usually 3 to 5
percent. In addition, the low transac-
tions costs of stocks have made them
readily available to borrow against,
whether from a brokerage account or,
more commonly, a retirement plan.
Nevertheless, some facets of hous-
ing enhance its relative accessibility.
When tapping financial wealth, con-
sumers face capital gains taxes and
early withdrawal penalties from retire-
ment accounts. Housing wealth, by
contrast, receives more favorable tax
treatment. Furthermore, several devel-
opments have enhanced housing’s liq-
uidity and thereby boosted the impact
on consumption of housing wealth rel-
ative to that of stock wealth. 
These developments are likely re-
Directly held stocks + 
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Chart 2
Once Again, Real Estate Exceeds Stocks 
as a Share of Net Worth
Percent
SOURCES: Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve Board; author’s calculations.lated to the low U.S. personal saving
rate of recent years. It turned negative
in early 2006, when households’
spending exceeded disposable
income. Conventional estimates of the
wealth effect cannot fully account for
why Americans are consuming more
and saving less. Increased liquidity of
home equity may provide an answer. 
Fueling Consumption 
We can think of the overall impact
of home prices on consumption as the
combination of two parts—the tradi-
tional wealth effect and the relatively
new and growing phenomenon of
mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW).
In recent years, U.S. households have
been extracting housing wealth through
home-equity loans, cash-out mortgage
refinancings or by not fully rolling
over capital gains from sales into down
payments on subsequent home pur-
chases. Because home-equity loans and
mortgages are collateralized, they usu-
ally carry lower interest rates than un-
secured loans; thus, homeowners can
borrow more cheaply. Also, by making
housing wealth more accessible, finan-
tracks the difference between increases
in mortgage debt and households’ home
investments, covers a longer period.
By this measure, MEW as a share
of labor and transfer income has be-
come more sensitive to swings in
home-price appreciation, aided by 
the lower cost and greater ease of cash-
out mortgage refinancings. In 2005,
MEW jumped to a record 5 percent of
income, but it slowed sharply in the
second quarter, when home-price
appreciation decelerated (Chart 3). 
As homeowners took money out
of their homes, consumption rose as a
share of GDP (Chart 4). Conventional
theories of wealth and consumption,
which tend to ignore credit and liquidi-
ty constraints, treat home-equity with-
drawals merely as manifestations of a
modest wealth effect. They cannot ac-
count for the unusually high consump-
tion levels of the first half of this dec-
ade. This high consumption may not
be sustainable if homeowners’ wealth
declines or increases less rapidly. Even
if home-price appreciation slows to
the low single digits, MEW is likely to
fall sharply, perhaps by as much as 5
percentage points of income.
The limited U.S. econometric evi-
dence indicates that the strong pace of
MEW may have boosted annual con-
sumption growth by 1 to 3 percentage
points in the first half of the present
decade.
8 This implies that a slowing of
home-price appreciation into the low
single digits might shave 1 to 2 per-
centage points off consumption growth
and 0.75 to 1.5 percentage points from
GDP growth for a few years.
While these estimates provide an
idea of housing’s potential economic
impact, considerable uncertainty exists
about how much a slowdown in MEW
might restrain consumption growth. Key
issues include how much home-price
appreciation might slow, how much
the deceleration would affect MEW and
how much a slowdown in MEW
would restrain consumer spending.
Housing Price Uncertainties.
Although the recent slowdown in home
prices has been dramatic, it’s still un-
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cial innovations have opened new ave-
nues for families to act more quickly
on their consumption preferences.
5
Consistent with a growing liquidi-
ty, or MEW effect, some new studies
have found wealth effects are now
greater than earlier research suggest-
ed. One estimates that a $100 rise in
housing wealth leads to a $9 increase
in spending. Another finds that in-
creases in housing wealth generate
three times the spending from stock-
price gains.
6 Neither study, however,
directly examines whether housing
wealth has a greater impact on con-
sumption today because of the greater
ease of accessing home equity.
Together, higher home values and
financial innovations have enabled
homeowners to more easily tap hous-
ing wealth. Mortgage equity with-
drawals have risen sharply recently
relative to income, whether measured
using the comprehensive approach of
Greenspan and Kennedy,
7 whose data
extend back to 1990, or a cruder defini-
tion based on the flow of funds ac-
counts. The two series tend to move





























Mortgage Equity Withdrawals Increasingly Sensitive
to Housing Inflation
Percent (two-quarter average)
SOURCES: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve
Board; author’s calculations.
Percent (year-over-year)role of speculation over the past few
years, for example, may increase the
likelihood of price declines. Owner–
occupiers directly benefit from living
in a home; they also incur moving
costs that speculators don’t. As a
result, owner–occupiers are probably
more resistant to selling at a lower
price than outside investors, who
have a greater incentive to sell quickly
when prospects for gains diminish.
Finally, mortgage rates remain
low. The impact of monetary policy
on housing demand appears to have
loosened in recent years, with increas-
es in the federal funds rate not acting
as quickly or forcefully on mortgage
costs (see box,“Interest Rates, Mort-
gages and the Housing Market”).
Mortgage Equity Withdrawal
Uncertainties. The link between
MEW and home prices is uncertain
because it has changed much. The
connection strengthened after home-
equity loans received favorable tax
treatment in 1986. More recently, tap-
ping home equity has been made eas-
ier by newer mortgage products, such
as cash-out financing, and declining
transaction costs.
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The motive for cash-out refinancing
can arise from a desire to shift wealth
out of housing, but it also may reflect
the desire to lower interest payments.
As a result, mortgage equity withdraw-
als have become more sensitive to
interest rate declines. The 2003 MEW
surge, for example, was linked less to
a run-up in home prices and more to
30-year fixed rates falling to the lowest
levels in decades (see Chart 3).
Consumption Uncertainties.
The connection between MEW and
consumption is more a medium-term
than a short-run phenomenon, and it
probably has evolved.
13 One reason is
that the factors affecting MEW also indi-
rectly impact consumption. They may
cause households to alter how much
of MEW they devote to consumer
spending, debt reduction, home
improvements or other investments. 
Given these uncertainties, predict-
ing how much a slowing housing mar-
ket will affect consumption is difficult.
This warrants monitoring of home
prices, MEW and underlying consump-
tion trends. We also might learn from
the experience of other countries,
especially the United Kingdom.
Lessons from Great Britain
Mortgage equity withdrawals have
been large in several other countries,
primarily those with well-developed
mortgage markets, high homeowner-
ship rates and solid property rights.
These include the U.K., which saw a
large swing in MEW activity in the
early 1990s, as well as Australia and
New Zealand, where MEW activity has
been linked to consumer spending.
14
Long-run studies of the U.K. show
that MEW boosted consumption growth
during the home-price upswing of the
late 1980s, but spending fell back when
MEW declined along with home prices
in the early 1990s.
15 The U.K.’s estimat-
ed housing wealth coefficient is nota-
bly larger than that in the U.S. prior to
2000. Nevertheless, recent Bank of
England research stresses that the links
between home prices and consumer
spending aren’t automatic. Rather, they
clear how much housing-price appreci-
ation will decelerate from the fast pace
of 2004–05. Analysts disagree about
the extent to which U.S. home prices
have been overvalued. A recent study
by Moody’s Economy.com maintains
that more than 100 of the nation’s 379
metropolitan areas, representing nearly
half the value of U.S. housing stock,
have a significant probability of seeing
price declines by the fall of 2007. On
the other hand, a Brookings Institution
paper argues that there wasn’t a bub-
ble in U.S. home prices in 2005.
9
In part, the disparate conclusions
may reflect changes in supply and
demand.
10 Traditional yardsticks may
overstate any degree of overvaluation
if land supply conditions have become
more restrictive over time, especially
in coastal areas, and if financial inno-
vations have permanently boosted
housing demand.
11 And differences
persist over which price measures to
use, as well as whether home prices
should be judged, along with the user
cost of housing, relative to house-
holds’ incomes or costs of renting.
12
Several other factors may influence














Consumption Share of GDP Jumps in Recent Years
Percent 
NOTE: Data are seasonally adjusted, annualized rates.
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis; author’s calculations.arise from financial innovation and the
optimizing behavior of households
that extract home equity for several
possible uses, not just consumption.
16
The U.K. research also notes that
the connection between consumption
and housing wealth, which reflects the
combination of traditional wealth and
MEW effects, became weaker as home
prices soared this decade. The recent
upswing in U.K. interest rates was much
smaller than the one in the 1980s, lead-
ing to less marked slowing of home-
price appreciation. Nevertheless, a
wealth effect helped slow consumption
growth in 2005.
One plausible explanation for the
less powerful home-price effects today
is that U.K. households were chastened
by earlier experience and earmarked
less MEW for consumption than in the
1980s. Although home prices and home-
equity extraction jumped sharply in the
late 1980s, both fell after short-term
interest rates rose. Because most U.K.
mortgages carry adjustable rates, the
7.5 percentage point upswing in short-
term rates between May 1988 and
October 1989 made housing unafford-
able not only for new buyers but also
for many existing homeowners, a half
million of whom lost their dwellings.
17
Several factors may limit the rele-
vance of recent British experience to
the U.S. First, the two nations’ housing-
price histories differ. Unlike the U.K.
in the early 1990s, the U.S. hasn’t ex-
perienced a notable nationwide drop
in home prices since perhaps the late
1960s.
18 This difference suggests that
Americans might adjust their spending
in reaction to home price movements
more than British households.
Second, the Bank of England 
didn’t tighten as much as the Federal
Reserve did in the early years of this
decade. The Fed pushed up its policy
rate 4.25 percentage points, consider-
ably more than the Bank of England’s
1.25 percentage points. As a result, in-
terest rates on adjustable-rate mortgages
rose more in the U.S. than in the U.K. 
Third, use of adjustable-rate mort-
gages is roughly twice as high in the
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Favorable trends in long-term inter-
est rates were a key factor in the hous-
ing market’s strength up until the sum-
mer of 2005. In the most recent inter-
est rate cycle, federal funds rate
increases didn’t push up market rates
for mortgages and other long-term
debt as much as in past cycles—a phe-
nomenon former Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Alan Greenspan
described as a “bond market conun-
drum” in 2005. 
Although it’s difficult to pinpoint the
reasons for this new behavior, econo-
mists have offered two plausible, but
not mutually exclusive, explanations—
one largely domestic, one largely glob-
al.
1
On the domestic side, a long period
of relative price stability has led
investors to see the Federal Reserve as
more committed than in the past to
keeping inflation low over the long run.
As a result, markets no longer view fed-
eral funds rate increases as signs that
inflation will be rising, and such
increases don’t push up longer-term
bond rates as much. 
Globalization has meant that long-
term U.S. interest rates are increasing-
Interest Rates, Mortgages and the Housing Market
ly affected by the supply and demand for
debt in major economies, as well as by
the success of foreign central banks in
keeping longer-term inflation expecta-
tions in check. In a world of more open
financial markets, foreign demand for
U.S. bonds helps keep long-term inter-
est rates from rising as much as they did
in the past.
The changing interest rate patterns
have important implications for housing.
Although the Fed began raising the fed-
eral funds rate in June 2004, mortgage
rates didn’t begin to increase noticeably
until the summer of 2005 (see chart). As
a result, the housing market didn’t cool
in 2004. Instead, building activity and
price gains continued for more than a
year before they began slowing in the fall
of 2005. Freddie Mac data show price
appreciation running at a 10 percent rate
in the second quarter of 2004. The addi-
tional year of persistently low mortgage
rates helped propel appreciation to its
cyclical peak of 13.9 percent in the sec-
ond quarter of 2005.
1 “Globalization’s Effect on Interest Rates and the
Yield Curve,” by Tao Wu, Federal Reserve Bank of
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Initial rates (percent)U.K., making British housing demand
more sensitive to short-term interest
rates. U.S. homebuyers, however,
have increasingly used mortgages with
negative amortization, multiple mort-
gages on the same property and inter-
est-only mortgages (Chart 5).
Higher home prices have been cor-
related with mortgage innovations that
boost housing demand by increasing
loan availability.
19 Similar mortgage lib-
eralization hasn’t occurred as much re-
cently in the U.K. as in the U.S. If a sus-
tained easing of U.S. mortgage prac-
tices has taken place, long-run U.S. hous-
ing demand probably has risen. On
the other hand, if new mortgage prac-
tices lead to greater-than-expected
loan-quality problems, there could be
a pullback in mortgage availability and,
thereby, in U.S. housing demand.
Fourth, home-supply conditions
are more flexible in the U.S., where
cost-of-living differences could induce
migration from high-cost coastal met-
ros to less expensive areas. This sug-
gests high home prices may not be as
sustainable in the U.S. as in the U.K.,
where tighter supplies of building lots
and fewer opportunities to migrate
within the country limit downward
pressures on home prices. 
Finally, a financial market boom
in London has helped support British
home prices in recent years.
20
Because these factors have oppos-
ing relative effects, it’s hard to tell
whether housing demand has down-
shifted more strongly in the U.S. than
in the U.K. The housing market uncer-
tainties also make it more difficult to
gauge the effects on consumption. 
A Need for Close Monitoring
The homebuilding retrenchment
probably will continue to restrain U.S.
economic growth in the near term,
while slower home-price appreciation
or outright price declines will likely
mean less stimulus to consumer spend-
ing. It remains to be seen, however,
how much housing prices will affect
consumer spending beyond the impact
of the traditional housing wealth effects. 
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Two factors make the relationship
between housing prices and consump-
tion difficult to predict. First, tradition-
al yardsticks may overstate the extent
to which home prices are overvalued
because of tighter land supplies than
in the past. At the same time, demand
for housing may have shifted upward
due to easier mortgage availability,
increased desire to live in coastal
areas and “star” cities, and increased
liquidity of housing wealth. In addi-
tion, house-price dynamics may have
changed because of abnormally high
investor activity in recent years. 
Second, forecasting the impact of
slower mortgage equity withdrawal on
consumer spending is difficult, espe-
cially because the U.S. experience is
so short. The U.K. offers a longer per-
spective, but its relevance may be lim-
ited because of British households’
prior experience with a major housing
bust. In addition, the recent rise of U.K.
home prices appears to have been
accompanied by a smaller shift to risky
mortgage practices than in the U.S.
As these uncertainties play out,
analysts and policymakers will need
to monitor the impact of slower
home-price appreciation on U.S. con-
sumption. It’s important to remember
that recent declines in housing activi-
ty have been from high and unsus-
tainable levels to more normal ones,
marking the unwinding of some earlier
speculation. A beneficial side effect
may be that income could catch up
with prices, making homes more
affordable. 
From a longer-term view, the
slowing of homebuilding and con-
sumption frees up resources for busi-
ness investment crucial to the produc-
tivity growth that fuels long-term
gains in living standards. Finally, the
impact of housing should be viewed
alongside developments in other eco-
nomic sectors to accurately assess
inflationary pressures and aggregate
demand over the short and medium
runs. 
Duca is a vice president and senior economist in
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